To What Extent was the Race for Arms and Mutual Assured Destruction Affected by the Creation of the Atomic Bomb?
December 13, 2005
Total Word Count: 1,730
Plan
A - Plan of the Investigation
Subject of Investigation: The Cold War
To What Extent was the Race for Arms
and Mutual Assured Destruction Affected by the Creation of the Atomic Bomb?
In the
summary of evidence, the race for arms, the theory of mutual assured
destruction, and the atomic bomb will be introduced and view points from key
individuals will be brought up. The analysis will evaluate the evidence
presented in plan B as well as further explain what was said in plan B. From this the researcher will determine what
the true extent that the bomb had on the race for arms and MAD. When this is found a conclusion will be
drawn.
Word Count: 109
Plan B - Summary of Evidence
The reason
that the “cold war never turned fully hot was due primarily to the restraints
imposed by the fear of nuclear devastation” (Frankel, 46). Strategists of the 1950s and the 1960s held
theories concerning blackmail, chicken (the child’s game), and escalation”
(Allison, 28). “Both Soviet and American
leaders believed at first that the mere threat of nuclear retaliation sufficed
to deter attack… but they soon learned that the number, style, and accuracy of
nuclear weapons could confer a significant advantage, and this compounded their
fears of an overpowering first strike by their adversary” (Frankel,
46-47). In fact, “the mutual baiting did
not end” and the Soviet propagandists took advantage of this new fear “in some
circumstances we might have to take the initiative” (56). Thus, the “arms race raged on, propelled by
the fears of surprise attack, of being underrated or judged unwilling to push
the nuclear button” (53).
In
retrospect, “the nuclear strategies of the United States and the USSR ranged
from straightforward deterrence to the threat of massive retaliation …include[ing]
the options of aiming nuclear weapons at other nuclear weapons and aiming them
at enemy cities. Behind all of these
approaches is the idea that any nuclear war would involve mutual assured
destruction (MAD) for the principals, possibly for the world as well. As a result, the United States developed a
weapons arsenal large enough to ensure that enough weapons would survive an
enemy first strike to retaliate effectively” (“Nuclear Strategy”, 34658).
USA
“The problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as
[is] not merely connected with but as [is] virtually dominated by the problem
of the atomic bomb. Except for the
problem of the control of that bomb…”(Stimson).
“…Until such time as the Soviet Union considers that it possesses an
adequate military capability (atomic as well as conventional) as compared to
the United States, it is improbable that the Soviets deliberately will venture
any military action which they might have reason to believe would involve them
in open war with the United States and its Allies… The Soviet Union is now
making and will continue to make aggressive use of time to improve its power
position, particularly now that it has developed an atomic weapon and can build
up a stockpile of bombs with which to aid in equalizing the scales of power” (“A
Report…”). The U.S. policy was going to
unknowingly “stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet toward the
development of [the atom] bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race
of a rather desperate character. There
is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced”
(Stimson). In response to this “the
United States had a second-strike capability which was as extensive as what the
Soviets could do in a first strike” (Frankel, 54).
USSR
In the beginning of the cold war the USSR would “not hesitate
to abandon UNO” thus they would “replace it with an international weapon more
effective from their viewpoint” (Kennan).
The USSR would try “to undermine general political and strategic
potential of major western powers” (Kennan).
“[Khrushchev] really meant to pursue “peaceful coexistence” with the
capitalist West and went out of his way to disown Stalin’s dictum that war was ‘inevitable’”
(Frankel, 45). [The term “peaceful
coexistence has come to imply a long-term political strategy”] (McCombs,
Maxwell, Shaw, and Weaver, 334).
Khrushchev actually believed that “nuclear weapons made war unwinnable”
(Frankel, 49). However, he continued to
threaten to “hurl nuclear rockets at Western capitals” (45).
Opposing Views
“[The USSR] embarked on a major rearmament effort of their
own in response to that of the United States” (Russett 9). “The United States was slightly behind in
this technology, and there were widespread fears that the Soviet Union would
build so many missiles (ICBMs) that they could threaten rapid destruction of
American bombers, on which the United States still relied for its deterrent“
(11).
Word Count: 631
Plan C - Evaluation of Sources
Max Frankel, one of America’s finest journalists,
worked for The New York Times for fifty years. While working there, he went from a rising
college correspondent and worked his way to being executive editor. He won the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of
Nixon’s trip in 1972 to China. His book,
High Noon in the Cold War, sparks much interest to many that read
it. Frankel shares the real story behind
the critical series of events during the cold war. His goal was to allows the reader to know
what was going on in the hearts and minds of the key decision-makers (Random
House Inc. and History New Network).
This book
was extremely useful to the researcher because it presented not only individual
situations but it also allowed the researcher to read about the overall
effects. The overall effect of the
atomic bomb was what was primarily looked at with this source; however, it was
not extremely useful in giving specific details (information which only a
primary source can give). This book also
had a certain bias against the USSR which makes the researcher decipher truths
from fallacies.
George
Kennan is a diplomat and historian. He
is best known as “the father of containment” and therefore acted as a key
figure in the emergence of the cold war.
His "long telegram" from Moscow in 1946 and the article he
wrote the next year under the pseudonym "X" have rightly been seen as
foundational texts of the cold war, expressing and legitimating Washington's
new and vigorously anti-Soviet policy.
In this telegram (the source used) he was the American chargé d'affaires
in Moscow and he wished to inform the President about certain conditions in the
USSR (Houghton Mifflin).
Obviously,
this primary source was extremely valuable and allowed the researcher to
understand what was being told to the U.S. President to warn about Soviet
nuclear weaponry. It did have a
limitation because it was not useful in seeing the long term effect but only in
seeing a very specific instance.
Word Count: 337
Plan D - Analysis
The effect
that the atomic bomb had on the race for arms and mutual assured destruction
must be studied and considered in history.
If the general society does not look at it then sometime in the future
the information will be lost. This could
allow something like what has happened to repeat itself. For instance, if a new weapon of a greater
mass destruction was created and used in a global war the new technology would
ultimately cause a global shift in power.
The atomic bomb, in the 1940s, was this new weapon and when it was
introduced to the world, world power and foreign politics changed.
As Stimson
stated, the problem with Russia was not merely connected to but virtually was
the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb upset
the balance of world power thus creating a race to “equalize the scales of
power”. The Soviets with their new found
technology of the atomic bomb were enabled to create more atomic weapons, which
in turn caused the Allied powers to fear retaliation from the Soviets. The American atomic bomb was the only thing
that allowed the Allies to have “world power”.
In order to maintain this upper hand in world power and ultimately
politics, the United States had to begin to compete with the Soviet Union. The armament of the Soviets caused fear
amongst the Allies for several reasons, one of which was the eventual
replacement of a peaceful organization for the new weapon, the atomic bomb,
allowing it to essentially dominate their foreign policy.
The theory
of mutual assured destruction spawned form the race for arms and according to
some was a primary cause in what kept the arms race going. This theory assured that both states involved
in the detonation of a nuclear weapon on another’s soil would also perish. For example, if the Soviets made a first
strike then the Americans could have a “second strike” just as effective in
destructing the USSR. Now, the nuclear
age had commenced and the fear of devastation is what effectively kept the USSR
and the USA from having a “hot war” rather then a “cold war”.
The introduction
of the atomic bomb created this new “arms race” and allowed for the creation of
“mutual assured destruction”. Threats
were thrown perpetually from one country to another. According to Frankel, Khrushchev really
wanted to pursue “peaceful coexistence” and did not believe that any war would
be worth it because “nuclear weapons made war unwinnable.” Khrushchev, however, did not actually pursue “peaceful
coexistence” because he continued to threaten nuclear warfare with the United
States. This showed that the USSR was
struggling internally and was contradicting itself in what it showed the people
and what it showed the world.
While the
evidence is overwhelming that the atomic bomb was essential to the race for
arms and ultimately mutual assured destruction, there were others who believe
the contrary. They believed that the
USSR was arming due to the armament of the United States. Which in analysis shows that they were not
racing for political and world power but simply for a feeling of security. This demonstrated that the atomic bomb was
not essential to the race for arms and ultimately the mutual assured
destruction theory.
Word Count: 540
Conclusion - Part E
It is clear
to see that the race for arms was a direct effect of the introduction of the
atomic bomb. The new technology in a
state’s self defense created a shift in global power. The theory of mutual assured destruction came
only after the beginning of the race for arms.
This ensured that the use of nuclear weapons (the atomic bomb and later
on the hydrogen bomb) would essentially be the end of whatever nation decided
to use it because of secondary and tertiary strikes; hence, the atomic bomb was
essential to this theory as well. One
can conclude that without the atomic bomb, there would not have been a cold
war.
Word Count: 113
Plan F - List of Sources
A Report by the Joint
Intelligence Committee on Implications of Soviet Possession of Atomic Weapons.
6 Dec. 2005 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/primary/jointintelligenc e.html.
Frankel, Max. High
Noon in the Cold War. New York: The
Random House Pub. Co., 2004.
Hammond, Dr. Thomas T. “A First hand look at the Soviet Union.” The National Geographic Magazine. Sep. 1959: Vol. CXVI No 3.
Houghton Mifflin.
“Kennan, George.” 10 Dec.
2005 http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/html/ah_049500_kennangeorge.htm.
Kennan, George. George Kennan's Telegram. 28 Nov. 2005
Nixon, Vice President Richard
M. “Russia as I saw it.” The National Geographic Magazine. Dec. 1959: Vol.
CXVI No 6.
Random House Inc. “Max Frankel.” 10 Dec. 2005
Plan F - List of Sources Continued
Russett, Bruce M. Nuclear
Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms Control Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms Control. San
Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1983. Questia.
27 Nov. 2005 http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=98392935.
Stimson, Henry. Henry Stimson to Harry S. Truman, accompanied
by a memorandum, September 11, 1945. President's Secretary's File, Truman
Papers. 9 Dec. 2005 http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/document s/index.php?documentdate=1945-09- 11&documentid=22&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1
Truman's Statement on
Detection of Soviet Atomic Test. 27 Nov.
2005
Word Count: 311
