April 2008
International Influences on Democratic Transitions
Case Studies: Portugal and Chile
Any state in the world could democratize given the right circumstances; however, it is important to understand that these circumstances are not necessarily universal (Tilly 2000, 1). This study will try to examine how one of those circumstances, international influence, has affected the processes of democratic transitions in the global arena. This will be done by performing a most-similar systems analysis of Chile and Portugal. The discussion of how international influences is an important thing to examine because some specialists in political science have viewed international influence as an external nuisance factor and have focused only on the domestic realm (Segal 1991, 30-31). This paper will assert that Portugal had a much easier time making its democratic transition than Chile because of international influence.
The cases of Portugal and Chile were chosen because they have very similar backgrounds and populations. According to the CIA WordFact Book, Portugal (in 2007) has an 84.5% Roman Catholic population and Chile has a 70% Roman Catholic Population. The fact that both countries have super-majorities of Catholics limits the influence that any other religion or religious sect would have over a state government on some civil liberties. In contrast, the Catholic Church would be able to influence the domestic sector of these states to a relatively high degree (Segal 1991, 37). This could be accomplished through the urging of the Church to its congregation to push for democracy in the state.
Another factor that would have a significant influence on the democratic transition would be the military. In both of these countries the military played substantial role in the transition to democracy, but in both cases they initially helped rather than hindered the transition (Casper and Taylor 1996, 7). This eliminates the question of the military being a determining factor because they both were military run coup d’états. Other things such as life expectancies (Portugal→77.87 and Chile→76.96), or the time that democratic constitutions were adopted and effective (Portugal→1976 and Chile→1980-81) are similar as well (Central Intelligence Agency 2007). Both of these countries eventually become electoral democracies with ratings of a one in both the political rights category and the civil liberties category in the Freedom House survey (Freedom House 2007). This is the best rating (most democratic) that the Freedom House survey offers. The processes in which Portugal and Chile get to this point, however, are very different.
The most obvious difference between Portugal and Chile is that Portugal is in Southern Europe and Chile is in at the southern tip of South America. However, this is desired in these case studies because it is the difference in geostrategic positions that one can examine what kind of international factors are the most influential. These and other factors will be discussed in more detail in the case studies.
One of the first and most important things that one needs to understand in these case studies is the difference between liberalization and democratization. Liberalization is “the toleration of democracy” whereas democratization “requires open contestation over the right to win control of the government” (Linz and Stephan 1996, 3). This ultimately means that an authoritarian (or communist) state can liberalize and tolerate some of the principles of democracy but not undergo a democratic transition. This is essential because in both Portugal and Chile there were many western ideas that were put into practice but a democratic transition was still unsure.
In today’s world, there have been an unprecedented number of successful democratic transitions and, as such, one should understand what a democratic transition is precisely. Transitions are regime changes within a state, and successful regime changes depend on many influences. Transitions can be a long and gradual process, as exemplified by Portugal, or they could be a rapid upset such as a revolution, as exemplified by Chile (Casper and Taylor 1996, 5). In many cases, the former can take years, generations, or even centuries for successful regime changes to occur because often an issue of national identity is at hand, not just a regime change (Whitehead 1991, 57). This is especially true with democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes.
Most scholars agree that the democratic transition ends at the establishment of a democratic constitution and the installation of a democratic regime; however, this regime change does not mark the end of the democratization process (Casper and Taylor 1996, 3 and 9-10). In all reality, there are many transitions that begin that never become consolidated or revert back to their old regime (Linz and Stephan 1996, 4). Other times, transitions occur that are successful in a change of regime, but they do not become democracies. Instead they become another form of government (Casper and Taylor 1996, 2). It is sad to say that this has been the global trend in the past because it is very hard to form a true democracy or even a regime that has the principles of democracy (Linz and Stephan 1996, xiii).
It is critical to be clear about whether a democratic transition has been successfully completed because if it is not clear then the population could mistake a true democratic transition for perhaps an electoral authoritarian regime. This could result in the citizenry questioning the motives and legitimacy of the new democratic leaders (Linz and Stephan 1996, 207). If a leader declares a democratic transition successful when it is not, then either there is a misunderstanding, they are willing to accept the undemocratic terms which they find themselves in, or they want to keep the undemocratic things around, as one finds in Chile (Linz and Stephan 1996, 207). All of these things are major concerns to a real democratic transition because they could turn into what Andreas Schedler calls electoral authoritarianism (2006). This is a regime in itself. Since it lacks certain fundamentals of a democracy it can and should not be called a democracy. A democratic transition is only successful when it produces a democratic regime that does not have to share its legislative and social powers with the prior regime or with other external forces (Linz and Stephan 1996, 3).
Democratic transitions usually require that the population take an active roll in pushing out the old regime and demand (or helping to reinforce) the legitimacy of the new democratic regime (Casper and Taylor 1996, 9). One way to identify this is in the role that the military plays. The less democratic a state is, the more power the military and not the civilians have (Pereira and Zaverucha 2005). Even elites play an important role as to whether the democratic transition will take hold and eventually become a consolidated democracy. Elite driven transitions are likely to be successful but they are also likely to have some remnants (often enclaves) of the leaving authoritarian regime. By contrast, mass-driven transitions are a bit harder to complete, but they are likely to have very few, if any, enclaves of the leaving authoritarian regime (Casper and Taylor 1996, 5 and 10).
These remnants can be found in electoral authoritarian regimes and some temporary governments that are meant to be in place for a very short time, as was the case in Chile with Pinochet. Thus, holding elections is a stepping stone to a democratic transition, but it does not mean that it has been successful, especially if the elections are not free and fair (Linz and Stephan 1996, 121). If free and fair elections are held they present an interesting opportunity in the form of allowing citizens to voice their opinions for better or worse, help legitimize a new democratic regime, and provide opportunity for new parties and political players (Linz and Stephan 1996, 120). In this way, an election can be the opportunity for an authoritarian regime that was hoping to prove legitimacy to be elected out of office because it would stir the people to organize their voice, again as seen in Chile (Casper and Taylor 1996, 7-8).
Since elections are such a key part of any democracy it is important to analyze all influences, both domestic and abroad. Domestic influences are often much easier to see and evaluate at face value than those in the international arena. The international arena complicates the situation by doing things such as encouraging the people to demand democracy, sending in covert operations and government agencies to aid in organization, providing funds to certain political hopefuls and not to others, and much more (Casper and Taylor 1996, 8). International actors could force out an authoritarian leader, but it has been proven, through history, that letting the domestic actors do it their own way provides a basis of ownership and legitimacy of a democratic regime and eventually a successful transition (Casper and Taylor 1996, 5 and 8).
The fact is that the state itself and the citizenry of that state are not the only ones that are affected by a regime change, especially a democratic transition. International relationships are modified or even changed completely because of the regime change. For the newly democratic state, economic international relationships and special interests abroad are affected. As such, it is very important to analyze how international players will protect their interests, and thus, the democratic transition (Segal 1991, 35).
In many of the early literatures on democratic transitions, international influences were omitted or underestimated because they were ignorant of how external forces interacted in given transitions because of secrecy (Wiarda 2001, 496). At the international level, transitions to democracy are important because democratic peace theory links democracies to being peaceful to one another in all realms of communication and trade (Kugler and Feng 1999, 139). There are two distinct ways having international influence, leverage and linkage. Leverage is essentially the way that a state uses its size and scope (economically and militarily) to influence others which in turn raises the stakes of repressions, fraud, or other domestic abuses (Levitsky and Way 2006, 201). There are five types of linkages (ties to western ideas and institutions) that any given state can have to another across the border and they are economic, geopolitical, social, communication, and transnational civil society association (Levitsky and Way 2006, 201-202). Neither one of these when used as a single influence are effective in pushing a state to choose democracy over another ideology (Levitsky and Way 2006, 201). Linkage can cause international and domestic politics to become so intertwined that it is difficult to have authoritarian regimes, as can be seen in the case of Portugal (Levitsky and Way 2006, 204).
In Portugal, international influence helped the state to condition itself for a democratic transition amidst challenges from other political ideologies to set in (Opello 1991, 100-101). Many international influences are not easily distinguishable because if government agencies intervened directly, they were often disguised or were conducted as covert operations (Wiarda 2001, 496). However, it is certain that there were some operations that were very active behind the scenes as carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Committee for State Security (KGB), and other intelligence agencies with interest in the area (Opello 1991, 90). The United States (US), for instance, intervened in Portugal in several ways. One way by which the US intervened was by sending in some CIA operatives to encourage domestic up rise such as attacking the PCP headquarters in the summer of 1975 (Opello 1991, 90).
Another way which they influenced Portuguese transition was by working through the Catholic Church, which was also pushing for democratic reform (Opello 1991, 91). At this time, the US and other western European states were supportive of any third world independence movements that had a possibility of creating another democratic state because this was a push for democracy in the world which, hypothetically, would create peace via the democratic peace theory (Magone 1997, 21). Some countries, such as the US, were so desperate for this to occur, that they even considered military intervention in Portugal; however, the European Community (EC) urged to act only in political ways and assured that Portugal would, with influence, become a democracy (Linz and Stephan 1996, 127).
Another significant influence on Portugal was that its geostrategic location was on the very Western edge of Europe and that it already had membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was a predominantly set up as a collective security against communists like the Soviet Union (USSR) (Opello 1991, 87). These were the bounds by which domestic actors had to act and try to manipulate. Since Portugal was the first transition in Southern Europe it had to work out its own way of transition by a trial and error process (Linz and Stephan 1996, 117).
This process was long, but because Portugal had already tied itself into a western international economy it had ample incentive to become democratic (Segal 1991, 36). Some of the ways that Portugal integrated itself into the western economy before its transition were by already having opened up its markets to be controlled by international supply and demand. This meant that trade and wages were controlled by outside influences, by creating domestic institutions such as banks that were openly communicating across borders, and by having a large and growing business class that was increasingly controlling economics in the state (Wiarda 2001, 492). Collectively this meant that Portugal’s domestic sector was highly influenced by influences abroad even if it went unnoticed (Magone 1997, 16). Since this long and difficult process had already occurred by the transition in the 1970’s the political transition (the relatively easiest part) only needed a push in the right direction to get the transition started (Wiarda 2001, 493).
The EC provided such incentive in the economic, legal, cultural, and supportive role in Portugal that it essentially created the framework and pressure essential for democracy to grow (Magone 1997, 14). This was especially true after the EC offered membership to Portugal if a transition to a democratic system occurred (Casper and Taylor 1996, 8). The EC created rewards for its members but the stipulations for entrance into the community included that the state had to be a democracy (ideally consolidated), have certain western institutions and a capitalistic market (Linz and Stephan 1996, 140-141). This influenced not just Portugal, but most of the European states. According to man of the domestic political elites becoming a member of the EC was the only way to insure consolidation of democracy (which is different than a transition to democracy) (Magone 1997, 14).
The regime in Portugal had strict restrictions on what the public could and could not do. For example, opposition parties were illegal; however, opposition “study groups” were not and this was a loop hole that many jumped through (Wiarda 2001, 490). These “study groups” were the equivalent of an opposition political party but did not have the official status and when it was legalized for opposition parties to exist these “study groups” were the center of the democratic parties that would take hold (Wiarda 2001, 490). Other things, such as strikes and lockouts, were also illegal but spawned grassroots organizations which would later influence democratic transition (Opello 1985, 55). In fact, Western Europe’s oldest dictatorship, by Oliveira Salazar, was over thrown on 25 April 1974, by a group called the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) which was comprised of mostly junior military officers (Linz and Stephan 1996, 118 and Opello 1991, 84). The “revolution of the carnations,” as it came to be known, occurred unexpectedly when the masses came out, despite urgings by the MFA not to, and put carnations into the barrels of military guard’s rifles (Linz and Stephan 1996, 118 and Magone 1997, 21).
Elections were held on schedule (25 April 1974), but some of the some of the more radical sectors advised people to leave their ballots blank or to vote because the elections were not important (Linz and Stephan 1996, 121 and Magone 1997, 24). Many people did come out and there was a relatively free and fair election. People had chosen their parliament; however, democratic transition was still uncertain.
This nonhierarchical military coup created a problem in the form of creation of interim governments where democratic consolidation seemed like a bleak possibility (Linz and Stephan 1996, 116). They used a non-democratic way of creating the constitution (Linz and Stephan 1996, 119). The constitution created in 1976, had some very undemocratic things incorporated in it, such as allowing the Council of Revolution, which consisted mostly unelected military men, to pass and judge the constitutionality of laws (Linz and Stephan 1996, 123). The government was unable to subdue the social movements occurring the domestic environment split into a fascist and an anti-fascist sector and since the radical faction of the MFA was gaining strength it made a democratic transition seem more unclear despite incentives abroad (Magone 1997, 22).
A transition was only clear when the Portuguese constitution was ratified on 2 July 1976; however, a democratic transition did not become clear until parliament was able to put the military run aspects of government under civilian control, which occurred in 1982 (, (Magone 1997, 26 and Casper and Taylor 1996, 13). Therefore, Portugal did not complete its democratic transition until 12 August 1982, when it simultaneously completed its consolidation as well (Linz and Stephan 1996, 120). Its induction to the EC on 1 January 1989 proved that Portugal had transitioned and consolidated democracy like they had predicted (Magone 1997, 33).
Chile, in comparison, had a different process of democratic transition. Chile did not have as many international influences as did Portugal because of its sheer geostrategic position in the world. Chile being located on the southern tip of South America meant that Chile could never be a part of the EC or enjoy any of the incentives, economic and otherwise, that members (like Portugal) would. If Chile had an organization similar to the EC one could easily say that Chile would have been more receptive to democratic ideals and institutions. To take that even further, one could assume that if Chile had the geopolitical advantage that Portugal has, a democratic transition (as attempted by the military coup d’état) would not lead to a dictator, namely Pinochet.
Chile is, however, considered one of the most successful democratic transitions in the contemporary world despite the lack of EC influence (Wilde 1999, 476). In fact, Chile had only two interruptions in its 150 years of democratic processes which is a history that Portugal did not share which meant that democratic influence was embedded in its past (Sanchez 2003, 65). In Chile, the most influential international effect was through demonstrations and through international interactions (Sanchez 2004, 81). In fact, the entire domestic arena was influenced by international forces and processes such as Spanish influence or world economic markets via trade and communication (Davis 2006, 262). Also, since the majority of the population in Chile is Catholic, the church influenced many people and worked in cooperation with others, such as the US, to have democratic reform there (Wilde 1999, 479).
The transition in Chile is considered a pacted transition in which the democratic opposition competes for power under the military dictatorship’s rules (Wilde 1999, 478). This leads to a transition by transaction, in other words the new democratic regime negotiated with the Pinochet regime during the transition as because the Pinochet realized there would be a transition that they could not avoid (Sanchez 2003, 65 and Heiss and Navia 2007, 165). This allowed a more clear and precise transition to democracy; however, it creates a harder time in consolidating democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 15). In fact, Chile has been classified as an unconsolidated democracy because of all of the authoritarian powers guaranteed in the 1980 constitution which were allowed stay during the regime change (Davis 2006, 247).
The military staged a coup d’état in which a governmental junta comprised of four leaders of the armed forces, were to take control (Sanchez 2003, 74). The junta abolished Chile’s previous constitution of 1925, and replaced it with its own vision and rules (Heiss and Navia 2007, 165). Pinochet was the head of the army, which gave him certain advantages, and within five years staged a coup within a coup in which he took control (Sanchez 2003, 74). The time when Chile was under military rule is often referred to as Pinochet’s regime; however, it is important to remember that the military junta was created to restore power to elected civilians (Hiss 2007, 165). This goal was disrupted as Chile became more of an authoritarian dictatorship through time, with Pinochet in control, and was completely authoritarian by the year 1978 (Sanchez 2003, 70). Pinochet was even found boasting that “nothing moves in Chile without my knowledge or permission” (Sanchez 2003, 74). This showed just the type of dictator he had become.
Pinochet had been able to create a large, loyal, support group through threats and incentives, which is why in Chile, the world did not see mass mobilization like they did in Portugal (Sanchez 2003, 75). Pinochet even had the business class in his pocket because the citizenry was uncertain of democracy and modern western institutions (Sanchez 2004, 75). This created a very difficult domestic arena for democratic institutions to form.
In 1980, a new constitution was approved, by undemocratic means, but it allowed the beginnings for democratic governance (Heiss and Navia 2007, 166 and Sanchez 2003, 67). While the opposition rejected this constitution they were able to use it against Pinochet as an opportunity, during the constitutionally demanded plebiscite elections, to coalesce and defeat Pinochet once and for all (Heiss and Navia 2007, 166). Pinochet held elections in 1989, mostly because he felt that he would win and prove his legitimacy (Casper and Taylor 1996, 8).
This constitution had flawed voting procedures and Pinochet after winning could boast that he would be the “elected” President; however, much to his dismay he lost because the opposition organized to unite 17 different political parties into one coalition against him (Linz and Stephan 1996, 206 and Casper and Taylor 1996, 8). Pinochet only received 44% of the vote (Linz and Stephan 1996, 206). In addition, the people of Chile finally began to take to the streets in protest in 1983 as a response to an economic crisis which put a quarter of the working class out of jobs (Wilde 2007, 479). These regular protests of the Pinochet regime were backed by the Catholic Church (who pushed for a return to democracy) and other international actors (Wilde 2007, 479). The consequences of this series of results were that an abrupt political and social change was about to occur which was vulnerable to external influence (Casper and Taylor 1996, 8).
In the domestic sector, what occurred was a battle between two different ideologies where democracy barely succeeded (Sanchez 2003, 72). Once Pinochet realized that he would not be President again, he quickly took it upon himself to implement restrictions (such as supermajorities) that would slow and make democratic transition difficult because he knew that controlling the pace of a transition was essential(Wilde 1999, 480 and Heiss and Navia 2007, 170). This meant that Chile returned to an elected government, but it had deeply embedded authoritarian remnants (Wilde 1999, 480). Included in the constitution is the inclusion of nine (out of the forty-seven) senators, which are not elected, a system that over-represents the conservative side which favored the ways of Pinochet’s regime, amendments having to filter through a Constitutional Court where the members were appointed by Pinochet, and the inclusion of Pinochet himself as the chief of the army until 1998, and then a senator for life after that (Sanchez 2003, 71 and Wilde 1999, 480).
All of these things were done very close to when Pinochet was to leave office which practically blind-sided the opposition because they had agreed to rule under the 1980 constitution and to eliminate the authoritarian enclaves by the amendment process (Linz and Stephan 1996, 206). Pinochet resigned as the commander of the army in 1998 when he took up his life position of senator (Wilde 1999, 474). There are those that believe that because Pinochet was still an active presence in the political arena the democratic transition did not cease and this researcher is one of them (Sanchez 2003, 79).
Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 and was nearly tried in Spain for the atrocities that occurred under his regime (Wilde 1999, 473 and Davis 2006, 250). This made him resign from his position in parliament in 1999 and thus acted as a catalyst for the democratic reform that was occurring in Chile (Davis 2006 249). Those who did not like the idea of trying Pinochet thought that it would shake the stability of democracy in Chile (Davis 2006, 246). Finally, Chile was able to complete its transition to democracy and begin to truly erase the authoritarian enclaves in the constitution (Davis 206, 250).
Through all of this it is obvious that Chile had a much harder time with its democratic transition than did Portugal due to mainly international influence. Both Portugal and Chile have some similarities in the process of democratic transition. Both were military coup d’états; however, they had very different outcomes. In Portugal through strife the military coup transitioned into a functioning democracy; whereas, in Chile, because of a lack of international influence, the coup by the military junta created a horrid dictator in the form of Pinochet. Another similarity is that the Catholic Church in conjunction with government agencies acted behind the scenes to influence domestic actors to mobilize and demand reform. In fact, in both states democratic transition was not implemented until after mass mobilization and the public demand for reform and democratic transition.
Besides these similarities the transition between Portugal and Chile were obviously very different. In Portugal, the state had already transitioned many institutions to a western capitalistic form and had also integrated its economic system in the international arena, but Chile did not change its institutions nor did it incorporate its economic system which is one of the major reasons that after the initial coup an authoritarian regime was able to take hold. These were the results of an international influence, namely the EC, which, as already established, Chile had no equivalent transnational organization.
Portugal underwent a gradual transition in which only a push by both international and domestic actors was needed to create a rather smooth democratic transition, but Chile underwent a radical transition. One day it was under authoritarian rule and the next, because of a plebiscite, the entire state was about to undergo a political and social transition to whatever political ideology was strongest. This created another difference between the Portuguese case and the Chilean case because international influence was essential at this time if democracy was to prevail.
These case studies emphasize the importance that international influences have on democratic transitions, especially when they are looked at from a geopolitical perspective. They show how transnational organizations, such as the EC, have a major impact on creating a smooth democratic transition by facilitating incentives in both the economic and social arenas. This researcher believes that international influences are very important to look at because a transition without enough of a push on the international level will fail to have a democratic transition. This varies from early ideas that international influences were irrelevant and that only the domestic sector should be examined. As these case studies show, both the international and domestic arena should be evaluated with equal consideration.
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